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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Case: 15-3341     Document: 003112639808     Page: 2      Date Filed: 06/01/2017
 3 
 
The Bankruptcy Code sets certain limits on the amount 
of time that debtors may be required to remain in Chapter 13 
proceedings and make payments on their debts.  This case 
presents two questions of first impression among the Courts 
of Appeals: whether bankruptcy courts have discretion to 
grant a brief grace period and discharge debtors who cure an 
arrearage in their payment plan shortly after the expiration of 
the plan term, and if so, what factors are relevant for the 
bankruptcy court to consider when exercising that discretion.  
Because we conclude the Bankruptcy Code does permit a 
bankruptcy court to grant such a grace period and the 
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in granting one 
here, we will affirm the rulings of the District Court, which in 
turn affirmed the relevant order and judgment of the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
I. Background 
This consolidated appeal presents two decisions for 
review from the District Court: one affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court in its denial of Appellant-Creditor’s Motion to Dismiss 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, and the other affirming 
the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of Appellee-Debtors’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment in a related adversary proceeding.  
Before addressing the facts relevant to those orders, a brief 
review of the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions is 
necessary to understand the rights and obligations at issue in 
this case.  
A. Statutory Background 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1301–1330, offers the possibility of relief to individual 
debtors who have some capacity to make payments on their 
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debts.  11 U.S.C. § 109(e).  After filing a voluntary petition 
for relief, a Chapter 13 debtor must propose a “plan” that 
provides for the payment of future earnings to cover claims 
on the debtor’s estate.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322(a)-(c).  The 
Code includes requirements for the contents of such a plan, 
including that the plan must provide for the payment of all 
priority claims and may not “discriminate unfairly” between 
classes of unsecured creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1322.  Relevant 
to this case, the Code requires that if the debtor’s income is 
higher than the median income for the state in which the 
debtor resides, “the plan may not provide for payments over a 
period that is longer than 5 years.”  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1).  
The proposed plan is subject to court approval, but the Code 
directs the bankruptcy court to confirm a proposed plan if it 
complies with the Code’s requirements, including that it is 
proposed in good faith and that it is anticipated “the debtor 
will be able to make all payments under the plan and to 
comply with the plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(6).   
 
The bankruptcy court may appoint a neutral trustee to 
collect the money paid under the plan and to distribute it to 
creditors throughout the plan period.  11 U.S.C. § 1302.  The 
total amount to be paid to the trustee in order to complete the 
goals of the plan, including charges for escrow account fees 
and the trustee’s services, is often referred to as the “plan 
base.”  Although “[t]he term ‘base’ is not found in the 
Bankruptcy Code,” it is “commonly understood to mean the 
sum of money that a debtor will pay through his Chapter 13 
plan.”  In re Jenkins, 428 B.R. 845, 849 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2010). 
 
Once confirmed, modifications to the plan are 
governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1329.  That section provides, in 
Case: 15-3341     Document: 003112639808     Page: 4      Date Filed: 06/01/2017
 5 
 
relevant part: “[a]t any time after confirmation of the plan but 
before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan 
may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or 
the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to … extend or 
reduce the time for such payments.”  11 U.S.C. §§ 1329(a)(2).  
However, it also incorporates § 1322(d)(1)’s five-year term 
limit by specifying that “the court may not approve” a plan 
modification that would extend the term to require payments 
more than five years after the first payment was due under the 
original plan.  11 U.S.C. § 1329(c).  Once a debtor meets his 
obligations by completing “all payments under the plan,” he 
becomes entitled to “a discharge of all debts provided for by 
the plan,” 11 U.S.C. § 1328, often referred to as a 
“completion discharge.”    
 
Of course, not all debtors are able to meet their plan 
obligations.  In that circumstance, the bankruptcy court may 
dismiss a case or convert it to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy “for 
cause,” including upon “material default by the debtor with 
respect to a term of a confirmed plan.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1307(c)(6).  Alternatively, the court may grant a “hardship 
discharge” of some of the debts if (1) the debtor cannot make 
all payments due to “circumstances for which [he] should not 
justly be held accountable,” (2) a certain amount of property 
has already been distributed under the plan, and (3) 
modification under § 1329 “is not practicable.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(b).   
B. Factual Background 
In 2009, Appellee-Debtors Paul and Beth Ann Klaas 
filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, proposing a plan that required payments of 
$2,485 each month for sixty months, i.e., five years, and that 
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was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court.  About a year after 
confirmation, in response to an increase in mortgage 
payments, the plan was amended to increase the payments to 
$3,017 a month for the remainder of the sixty-month period.  
This new monthly payment reflected an anticipated plan base 
of $174,059.24 that Debtors were then required to pay to 
complete the plan’s goals.  Debtors made consistent monthly 
payments and, after sixty months, they had paid a total of 
$174,104, slightly exceeding their projected plan base.   
 
Nevertheless, sixty-one months after the start of the 
plan, Appellee-Trustee Ronda Winnecour filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), alleging that her 
final calculation showed that Debtors still owed $1,123 to 
complete their plan base.1  She noted in her motion that 
“[s]hould the debtors remit funds sufficient to complete the 
plan, the Trustee [would] not object to withdrawing her 
motion to dismiss.”  Appellant App. Vol. II, 7.  Debtors cured 
the arrears within 16 days of the motion alerting them to the 
deficit, and the Trustee consequently withdrew the motion.  
 
By that point, however, the Trustee’s motion had been 
joined by Appellant-Creditor Elizabeth Shovlin, who was the 
successor in interest to a holder of several unsecured claims 
against Debtors, and Creditor pressed forward, arguing that 
                                              
1 The record is unclear about the source of this 
shortfall.  The Bankruptcy Court found that it was largely due 
to an increase in the Trustee’s fee during the term of the plan, 
and not to any missed payments during the plan term.  In re 
Klaas (“Klaas III”), 548 B.R. 414, 424 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2016). 
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the late payment was invalid because the plan and the Code 
required all payments to be completed within sixty months.2  
While the Bankruptcy Court agreed that the failure to 
completely fund the plan base within sixty months was a 
material default constituting cause for dismissal under 11 
U.S.C. § 1307(c), it also found that the default was not the 
result of an unreasonable delay by Debtors, that Debtors 
promptly corrected the deficiency, and that the delay did not 
significantly alter the timing of plan distributions to creditors.  
The court, therefore, denied the Motion to Dismiss, 
concluding that “[b]y the time of the hearing on the trustee’s 
motion, the default was no longer material,” and that Debtors 
had “fully funded their plan obligations.”  In re Klaas 
(“Klaas I”), 533 B.R. 482, 488 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015).  
Creditor appealed the order denying the motion, and the 
District Court affirmed.  Shovlin v. Klaas (“Klaas II”), 539 
B.R. 465, 466 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
Creditor also initiated an adversary proceeding by 
filing a complaint objecting to the discharge of the Klaases’ 
debts.  Nearly a year after its decision on the Motion to 
Dismiss, the Bankruptcy Court, relying on that ruling and the 
law of the case doctrine, again rejected Creditor’s arguments 
that the failure to complete all payments within the plan term 
mandated dismissal and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Debtors.  In re Klaas (“Klaas III”), 548 B.R. 414, 425 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016).  The Bankruptcy Court issued a 
                                              
2 Creditor also argued that Debtors should be denied a 
discharge on the basis that they failed to timely complete a 
required financial management course, In re Klaas (“Klaas 
I”), 533 B.R. 482, 485–86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015), but she 
does not raise this issue on appeal. 
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completion discharge, Bankr. Case 09-29574 Dkt. No. 211,3 
and the District Court again affirmed on appeal, Shovlin v. 
Klaas (“Klaas IV”), 555 B.R. 500, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2016).  
Creditor then filed a notice of appeal of the adversary case, 
which was consolidated with the first appeal before our 
Court. 
II. Jurisdiction 
Although no party in this case contests our jurisdiction, 
“[w]e have an independent obligation to ascertain our own 
jurisdiction” before we may reach the merits of the case.  In 
re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1991).  
And although the two appeals have been consolidated before 
us, “[n]either consolidation with a jurisdictionally proper case 
nor an agreement by the parties can cure a case’s 
jurisdictional infirmities.”  Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 
866 (3d Cir. 1996).  For these reasons, we must verify that we 
can exercise jurisdiction over each of the consolidated cases 
independently.   
 
District courts have “jurisdiction to hear appeals … 
from final judgments, orders, and decrees … of bankruptcy 
judges,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and, in turn we have jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from “all final decisions, judgments, orders, 
and decrees entered” by a district court.  28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  
On appeal, then, “[t]he finality issue must be resolved with 
respect to the decisions of both the bankruptcy judge and the 
district court.”  In re White Beauty View, Inc., 841 F.2d 524, 
526 (3d Cir. 1988).   
                                              
3 The court provided, however, that the discharge is 
subject to any claims held by Creditor after the outcome of 
this appeal.  Bankr. Case 09-29574 Dkt. No. 216. 
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Typically, in civil litigation, a decision is only final if 
it leads to a court’s complete disassociation from a case.  
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2015).  
The challenge in this case is that, while the Bankruptcy 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in the adversary case 
clearly did conclude the court’s involvement in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, its order denying Creditor’s Motion 
to Dismiss did not.  Creditor’s appeal from the denial of the 
Motion to Dismiss therefore requires additional analysis to 
determine if that order, and the District Court’s affirmance of 
that order, should nonetheless be deemed final and, hence, 
subject to our review.   
 
We start with the premise that “[c]onsiderations unique 
to bankruptcy appeals have led us to construe the factor of 
finality somewhat more broadly in this context than under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.”  In re White Beauty View, Inc., 841 F.2d at 
526.  Because bankruptcy proceedings are often “protracted 
and involve numerous parties with different claims,” we take 
a pragmatic approach and examine the practical effect of the 
court's ruling.  Id.  Simply put, when it comes to analyzing 
the finality of an order, “[t]he rules are different in 
Case: 15-3341     Document: 003112639808     Page: 9      Date Filed: 06/01/2017
 10 
 
bankruptcy.”4  Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692.  Our Court 
considers four factors in this analysis: “(1) the impact on the 
assets of the bankruptcy estate; (2) the need for further fact-
finding on remand; (3) the preclusive effect of a decision on 
the merits; and (4) the interests of judicial economy.”  In re 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 
2005).   
 
Here, as to the first factor, we find it relevant that in 
the course of denying Creditor’s Motion to Dismiss, the 
Bankruptcy Court explicitly reached the legal conclusion that 
“the Debtors have completed their plan obligations.”  Klaas I, 
533 B.R. at 489.  The practical effect of that conclusion was 
to certify the case as eligible for a completion discharge, and 
the Bankruptcy Code directs courts to grant a discharge “as 
soon as practicable” following this determination.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a).  This functionally ended the bankruptcy case and 
thus affected Creditor’s claim on the estate.   
 
As to the second and third factors, the parties agreed 
there were no disputed factual issues (and, hence, no need for 
further fact-finding) relevant to the availability and propriety 
                                              
4 In In re Christian, for example, we exercised 
jurisdiction over a district court order affirming a bankruptcy 
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a Chapter 7 case because 
without timely appellate review, the entire bankruptcy 
proceeding would have had to be completed before it could 
be determined whether the case was properly brought in the 
first place, and such a resolution would not be “desirable or 
practical.”  804 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1986).  See also In re 
Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Brown, 916 
F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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of a grace period for debtors here to cure their arrearage.  As 
a result, the parties’ rights and obligations on those issues 
were settled by the court’s decision on the Motion to Dismiss, 
and both the Bankruptcy Court and District Court gave that 
decision preclusive effect by applying the law of the case 
doctrine when adjudicating the adversary claim and 
concluding that discharge was a foregone conclusion.  See 
Klaas III, 548 B.R. at 421; Klaas IV, 555 B.R. at 507. 
 
Admittedly, the fourth factor—judicial economy—
may have been better served had Creditor waited to appeal 
until after final judgment was rendered in both the bankruptcy 
and the adversary proceeding.  That would have relieved the 
District Court of the burden of adjudicating these appeals 
separately.  But now that both appeals are before our Court, 
this factor too counsels in favor of adjudicating both claims.   
 
In sum, all four of the relevant factors indicate the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the Motion to Dismiss, and 
consequently the District Court’s order affirming that denial, 
should be deemed final orders.  We therefore may exercise 
jurisdiction over both appeals. 
III. Standard of Review 
In reviewing bankruptcy court decisions on appeal, we 
“stand in the shoes” of the district court and apply the same 
standard of review.  In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 
201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  Accordingly, “we review 
the bankruptcy court’s legal determinations de novo, its 
factual findings for clear error and its exercise of discretion 
for abuse thereof.”  In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 145 F.3d 
124, 131 (3d Cir. 1998).   
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Here, the order granting Debtors summary judgment is 
subject to plenary review.  Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 
1530 (3d Cir. 1993).  The other order under review, denying 
Creditor’s Motion to Dismiss, is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, but the bankruptcy court necessarily abuses its 
discretion when its decision “rests upon … an errant 
conclusion of law.”  In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 
159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  In this case, Creditor 
argues that the Bankruptcy Court’s exercise of discretion to 
allow a curative payment rather than dismiss the case was 
premised on an errant legal conclusion—specifically, the 
conclusion that “the Debtors were entitled to a discharge 
under section 1328(a) when they did not complete all of their 
payments within the 60-month term of their Plan,” Creditor 
Reply to Trustee Br., 2, and we exercise plenary review over 
any conclusions of law that form the basis for an exercise of 
discretion, In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 159; see also 
In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
before we can determine whether a bankruptcy court abused 
its discretion, we must determine as a matter of law whether 
the court “had any discretion to exercise”).   
 
In short, despite the different procedural posture of the 
two orders under review, both turn upon the same narrow and 
dispositive legal question: whether Debtors may be granted a 
completion discharge under § 1328(a), despite having 
completed their plan base funding only after the end of the 
sixty-month term.  The District Court correctly reviewed that 
question de novo when it was presented on each appeal, see 
Klaas II, 539 B.R. at 469; Klaas IV, 555 B.R. at 506–07, and 
we will do the same. 
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IV. Analysis 
Creditor argues that because, in her view, the 
Bankruptcy Code compels courts to dismiss a bankruptcy 
proceeding whenever a shortfall remains at the conclusion of 
the five-year term, the Bankruptcy Court here abused its 
discretion in denying her Motion to Dismiss and erred in 
granting summary judgment.   
 
It appears this is a recurring problem in bankruptcy 
cases, for “many situations … may arise in which completion 
of the monthly plan payments will not result in the payment 
of the dividends required by the Bankruptcy Code and 
promised in the plan,” such as when “fees are higher than 
projected, administrative expenses are incurred, … or larger 
than expected secured claims are filed” after plan 
confirmation.  In re Estrada, 322 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2005).  While the modification procedure may be used to 
adjust for some of these changes during the course of the 
plan, “there will be the occasional case where the plan’s 
insolvency is not apparent until very late in the case,” and 
“despite the trustee’s and the debtor’s best efforts to avoid the 
problem, the plan payments may not fund” all dividends and 
expenses necessary to complete the plan base.  Id.; see also In 
re Escobedo, 169 B.R. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).  The Code 
does not expressly provide for this scenario, nor does it 
appear that the United States Trustee Offices have developed 
a consistent practice to address it.  Oral Argument at 26:56 
(No. 15-3341), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-
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argument-recordings.5  In the absence of an ex ante solution, 
however, we hold that bankruptcy courts retain discretion 
under the Bankruptcy Code to grant a reasonable grace period 
for debtors to cure an arrearage, and we also hold that the 
Bankruptcy Court here did not abuse its discretion in doing so 
in this case.  We explain the basis for each holding below. 
A. Discretion under the Bankruptcy Code 
We interpret provisions of the Bankruptcy Code using 
established canons of statutory construction.  In re Armstrong 
World Indus., 432 F.3d at 512.  We begin with the plain 
language of the statute, and if its meaning is plain, we “make 
no further inquiry unless the literal application of the statute 
will end in a result that conflicts with Congress’s intentions.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  We also read statutory provisions in 
context and avoid an interpretation that is incompatible with 
the rest of the law.  United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 
Creditor argues that the plain language of the statute 
bars any payment after the plan term.  Specifically, as 
Creditor points out, § 1322 instructs that a court “may not” 
approve a proposed plan if it schedules payments over a 
period of more than five years.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).  
                                              
5 We note that the practice of the Trustee in this case, 
of filing and then withdrawing motions to dismiss after the 
end of the plan term, appears problematic—tending to 
produce unnecessary litigation as it did here.  Indeed, even 
the Trustee acknowledged a better approach would be to 
conduct an audit and provide notice to the parties by filing a 
motion for a status conference prior to the end of the plan 
term.  Id. at 37:05. 
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Likewise, under § 1329, a court “may not” approve a 
proposed plan modification that would schedule payments to 
be due more than five years after the first payment under the 
original plan was due.  11 U.S.C. § 1329(c).  And in addition, 
the court must find the plan is proposed “in good faith” and it 
is anticipated at the time of confirmation or modification that 
“the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan 
and to comply with the plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 
§ 1329(b)(1) (incorporating the requirements of § 1325(a)). 
 
In focusing on these sections of the Code, however, 
Creditor misapprehends the relevant question, which is not 
whether bankruptcy courts may confirm a plan or plan 
modification that proposes a plan term greater than five years.  
Plainly, it may not.  The relevant question here, however, is 
whether a bankruptcy court may deny a motion to dismiss 
and/or grant a completion discharge when there remains at the 
end of that plan term a shortfall that the debtor is willing and 
able to cure.  And the answer to that question is that it may—
an answer found in two entirely different sections of the 
Code, namely, § 1307, which governs the Bankruptcy Court’s 
power to grant a dismissal, and § 1328, which governs its 
power to issue a completion discharge. 
 
Section 1307, for example, not only has no express 
restriction on term length, but also provides that upon a 
material default, the court “may”—not must—dismiss a case 
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for cause.  11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).6  That permissive language, 
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947), stands in 
contrast to the “may not” language of §§ 1322 and 1329, 
which by definition is prohibitive.  11 U.S.C. § 102(4) 
(defining “may not” as “prohibitive, and not permissive”).  
Indeed, although no other Court of Appeals has squarely 
addressed this issue to date, a number of bankruptcy courts 
have, and the majority have drawn this same distinction 
between criteria for plan confirmation and criteria for 
dismissal.7  See, e.g., In re Brown, 296 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2003) (“[W]hile the court may not confirm a plan 
which is to run for more than 60 months, nothing in the Code 
mandates dismissal of a case with a confirmed plan which 
ends up needing some extra time to complete.”); In re Harter, 
279 B.R. 284, 288 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2002) (“[Section] 
1322(d) does not contain a ‘drop dead’ provision that 
mandates dismissal of the case after five years.”); see also 8 
Collier on Bankruptcy (16th Ed.), ¶ 1322.18[2] (footnote 
                                              
6 As the Bankruptcy Court here assumed Debtors’ 
failure to fund the plan base before the end of the plan period 
constituted a “material default by the debtor with respect to a 
term of a confirmed plan,” 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6), Klaas I, 
533 B.R. at 487–88, and Debtors do not challenge this ruling 
on appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that the $1,123 
arrearage at issue constituted a plan default.   
 
7 The only Court of Appeals to have considered the 
issue is the Seventh Circuit, which recently assumed, without 
deciding, that a bankruptcy court had discretion to allow a 
debtor to cure a default resulting from a failure to make all 
payments within the five-year plan period.  Germeraad v. 
Powers, 826 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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omitted) (“[S]ection 1322(d) … focuses on the payments 
provided for by the plan.  If payments are late, but the debtor 
is substantially complying with the plan, the court should 
allow the plan to be completed within a reasonable time after 
the stated term.”). 
Likewise, § 1328 directs bankruptcy courts to issue a 
completion discharge if the debtor has completed “all 
payments under the plan,” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), without an 
express requirement that such payments were made within 
five years.  While Creditor would read such a requirement 
into the phrase “under the plan,” that reading would be in 
conflict with the way that phrase is used elsewhere in the 
Code.  Section 1325(a)(6), for example, requires the 
Bankruptcy Court at confirmation to verify that the debtor is 
able “to make all payments under the plan” and also “to 
comply with the plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).  
Distinguishing between these two requirements would be 
unnecessary, and the first would be rendered superfluous, if, 
as Creditor asserts, making “all payments under the plan” 
requires perfect compliance with each plan term, including 
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the term length.8  See In re Fesq, 153 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“[A]s a general rule of statutory construction ‘[w]e 
strive to avoid a result that would render statutory language 
superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant.’”).   
In addition, we have previously interpreted the nearly 
identical phrase “under a plan confirmed” as used in 11 
U.S.C. § 1146(c) to simply mean “made pursuant to the 
authority conferred by such a plan,” In re Hechinger Inv. Co. 
of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2003), and we 
assume “identical words used in different parts of the same 
act are intended to have the same meaning,” Sorenson v. 
                                              
8 Creditor seeks to engraft principles of contract law 
onto our statutory interpretation, insisting that payment within 
sixty months is a necessary condition precedent to discharge 
and that a failure to fully fund the plan within sixty months is 
therefore an irreparable breach of the plan.  True, the Klaases’ 
plan contains a clause that prohibits the Trustee from 
extending the plan term beyond sixty months.  But even if 
this could be read to prohibit the Trustee from accepting the 
late payment made in this case, we have never held that a 
Chapter 13 plan creates a contract between a debtor and his 
creditors governed by common law principles, nor have we 
held that all of the debtor’s rights under the Bankruptcy Code 
are extinguished upon breach of any particular plan term.  
Creditor relies on our holding in In re Shenango Group, Inc., 
in which we applied contract principles in the bankruptcy 
context, but we did so there to resolve a dispute about the 
correct construction of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, not 
to interpret the rights of the parties under the Bankruptcy 
Code itself.  501 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2007).  This analogy 
is therefore unavailing. 
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Sec’y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986).  
Consistent with this canon, if the District Court allows a grace 
period so that the final payment exceeds five years, the 
payment due is still “pursuant to the authority conferred by 
[the] plan,” In re Hechinger, 335 F.3d at 254, so that if the 
debtor makes that payment, he will have completed all 
payments “under the plan” and the bankruptcy court “shall 
grant the debtor a discharge.  11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).9 
While the text is unambiguous and we need not refer 
to legislative history, the history of the act here reinforces our 
conclusion and sheds light on the statute’s purpose.  See Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344, 350–51 (1943).  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
amended the former Bankruptcy Act, which the Reform Act 
described as “overly stringent and formalized,” in order to 
make wage earner plans more flexible and to encourage the 
use of debt repayment plans rather than liquidation.  H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, at 117 (1977).  The House Judiciary 
Committee Report for the Reform Act also lamented that 
wage payment plans had become “a way of life for certain 
debtors” and that extensions on plans for seven to ten years 
had “become the closest thing there is to indentured servitude; 
                                              
9 For the avoidance of all doubt, we are not holding 
that a debtor has an absolute right under the Bankruptcy Code 
to cure an arrearage after the five-year limit has passed and 
thus obtain a completion discharge.  Rather, we interpret the 
statute to grant bankruptcy courts discretion to deny dismissal 
and allow a grace period, so that if such payment is made 
within that grace period, the debtor will then have completed 
“all payments under the plan” and only then would be 
statutorily entitled to a discharge.  11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 
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it lasts for an indentifiable [sic] period, and does not provide 
the relief and fresh start for the debtor that is the essence of 
modern bankruptcy law.”  Id.  In response to Congress’s 
evident concern about debtors being forced to remain in 
repayment plans indefinitely, the Act capped the plan term at 
five years, an amendment the District Court here aptly 
described as intended to provide “a shield” for debtors rather 
than “a sword” for creditors.  Klaas IV, 555 B.R. at 513.  
Interpreting §§ 1307 and 1328 to mandate dismissal and 
preclude a completion discharge thus would be contrary not 
only to the language of the Bankruptcy Code but also to the 
purpose of the five-year cap. 
In view of the statutory language and purpose, we find 
Creditor’s remaining two objections unpersuasive.  First, 
Creditor points out that 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c) prohibits courts 
from approving a plan modification that would provide for 
payments beyond five years.  Creditor contends that the 
bankruptcy court may not grant forgiveness where it could 
not otherwise grant permission, and that allowing debtors to 
make a plan payment after five years would constitute an 
informal modification of the plan beyond the five years 
permitted by § 1329(c).  Debtors in this situation, however, 
are not seeking to modify their commitments and create a 
new plan, but instead to complete the payments owed under 
their confirmed plan.  We therefore agree with the Seventh 
Circuit’s observation, albeit dictum, that allowing such 
curative payments would not modify the plan because the 
payments at issue “would not be payments ‘provide[d] for’ by 
[a] modified plan; rather, they would be payments made to 
cure a default … i.e., payments made because the debtors did 
not make the payments ‘provide[d] for’ by the plan in the first 
place.”  Germeraad v. Powers, 826 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 
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2016).  Moreover, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, given that 
debtors who default early in the case can cure the default 
without requesting formal modification, denying that 
opportunity to debtors after a lengthy track record of good 
faith payments would “impose a standard of perfection at the 
conclusion of the plan term that does not exist at any other 
point in the case.”  Klaas I, 533 B.R. at 487.   
Second, Creditor asserts that a hardship discharge, 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b), is the exclusive remedy for a 
debtor who fails to make all payments within the five-year 
plan period, foreclosing a completion discharge by way of a 
late curative payment.  Section 1328(b) gives a bankruptcy 
court discretion to grant a hardship discharge when a debtor 
fails to complete all payments under the plan “due to 
circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held 
accountable.”  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).  That section, however, 
provides a stop-gap for debtors who tried in good faith to 
complete all payments and find themselves at the end of the 
plan term unable to do so.  That bankruptcy courts may grant 
a partial discharge in that situation has no bearing on whether 
they may decline to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding and 
may grant a completion discharge for debtors who are able 
and willing at the end of their plan term to complete their plan 
funding. 
Creditor’s argument would also produce absurd 
results.  Where, as here, debtors substantially complied with 
the Plan and acted in good faith to make a prompt payment as 
soon as they were notified of an arrearage, it would hardly 
make sense to deny them the benefit of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy by dismissing the entire proceeding.  Nor would it 
make sense to require such debtors to seek a hardship 
discharge, i.e., to withhold the remainder of the plan funding 
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that they have at their disposal and deprive creditors of those 
distributions simply because the payment is late.  On the 
contrary, that would contravene the Code’s goal of 
“provid[ing] for the efficient and equitable distribution of an 
insolvent debtor’s remaining assets to its creditors,” 
Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 
233, 251 (3d Cir. 2001), and we decline to interpret § 1328 in 
such a manner, see United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (instructing courts to construe 
the language of statutes to avoid results that are “absurd” or 
“at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole”). 
B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Exercise of Discretion 
Having concluded that bankruptcy courts have 
discretion to allow a grace period for a late curative payment 
and thus to deny dismissal and issue a completion discharge, 
we turn to the question whether the Bankruptcy Court here 
exercised that discretion properly.  Before we can make that 
determination, however, we must first identify what factors 
should inform the exercise of that discretion.  
 
While none of our sister Circuits have yet examined 
this threshold question, the bankruptcy courts that have 
addressed this question consistently rely on In re Brown, 
which identified four factors as relevant: “[(1)] How much 
longer is it going to take to complete the plan?[; (2)] Has the 
debtor been diligently making plan payments?[; (3)] How 
much time has elapsed since confirmation before dismissal is 
sought?[; and (4)] If the plan cannot be completed on time 
Case: 15-3341     Document: 003112639808     Page: 22      Date Filed: 06/01/2017
 23 
 
due to a large prepetition claim, was the debtor culpable in 
failing to properly schedule the claim?”  296 B.R. at 22.10 
 
We agree that In re Brown offers a helpful starting 
point, but it does not account for certain additional factors we 
deem relevant, such as the materiality of the default or 
whether allowing a cure would prejudice any creditors—two 
considerations that the Code expressly identifies as relevant 
to a motion to dismiss.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).  In addition, 
we draw helpful guidance from our case law concerning the 
circumstances in which a district court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, may set aside a default judgment.  In that context, 
we also have instructed district courts to consider any 
prejudice the plaintiff will suffer if the default is lifted, as 
well as the defaulting defendant’s ability to present a 
meritorious defense, the excusability or culpability of the 
                                              
10 See, e.g., In re Henry, 368 B.R. 696, 701–02 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007) (affirming a bankruptcy court’s application of the In 
re Brown factors and its exercise of discretion to allow a 
cure); In re Hill, 374 B.R. 745, 749–50 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
2007) (allowing a cure based on the debtors’ history of 
consistent payments and lack of culpability); cf. In re Black, 
78 B.R. 840, 843 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (noting that a cure 
was appropriate because creditors would receive a sufficient 
dividend).  Bankruptcy treatises likewise cite In re Brown, 
see, e.g., Hon. W. Homer Drake, Jr., et al., Chapter 13 
Practice & Procedure, § 4:9 Maximum Duration of Plan (2d 
ed. 2016); Francis C. Amendola, et al., 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy 
§ 152 What Constitutes Cause (2017), or advise that a cure 
should be permitted if the debtor is “substantially complying 
with the plan,” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy (16th Ed.), ¶ 
1322.18[2]. 
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defendant’s conduct, and the effectiveness of applying 
alternative sanctions.  See Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 
F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 
Building on In re Brown, and taking into account 
considerations relevant to § 1307(c) and the analogous default 
judgment context, we conclude the non-exhaustive list of 
factors a bankruptcy court should consider in deciding 
whether to allow a grace period include: (1) whether the 
debtor substantially complied with the plan, including the 
debtor's diligence in making prior payments; (2) the 
feasibility of completing the plan if permitted, including the 
length of time needed and amount of arrearage due; (3) 
whether allowing a cure would prejudice any creditors; (4) 
whether the debtor's conduct is excusable or culpable, taking 
into account the cause of the shortfall and the timeliness of 
notice to the debtor; and (5) the availability and relative 
equities of other remedies, including conversion and hardship 
discharge.  
 
Applying these factors, we have no trouble concluding 
that the Bankruptcy Court here properly exercised its 
discretion.  First, the Bankruptcy Court found that Debtors 
had diligently and timely made each of the sixty monthly 
payments called for in their plan, had promptly augmented 
their payments when the mortgage payment increased mid-
term, and had not violated any other plan terms.  Klaas I, 533 
B.R. at 484–85, 488–89; Klaas III, 548 B.R. at 417.   
 
Second, the Bankruptcy Court found that a cure was 
feasible: the arrearage was small relative to the plan base; 
Debtors were financially able and willing to cure; and 
Debtors did so promptly once notified, making payment even 
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before the hearing on the motion.  Klaas I, 533 B.R. at 488–
89.   
 
Third, crucial to the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion 
and ours today, that court found the tardiness of the curative 
payment did not adversely affect any creditor.  Klaas III, 548 
B.R. at 425.  On the contrary, it completed the plan base and 
enhanced the funds available for distribution.  Even Creditor 
does not contend that her rights under the plan were 
prejudiced.   
 
Fourth, the Bankruptcy Court found that the shortfall 
was not the result of an unreasonable or culpable delay by 
Debtors, and the only cause for the arrearage identified in the 
record or by the parties at argument was the Trustee’s own 
fee increase that the Trustee did not call to Debtors’ attention 
until after the end of the plan term.  Id. at 424.  Creditor has 
not suggested that Debtors had knowledge of the arrearage 
before that point, and the record indicates that the reason they 
did not was the approach taken by the Trustee of filing a 
Motion to Dismiss in the sixty-first month and withdrawing it 
instead of, e.g., conducting an audit and giving notice to 
Debtors before the plan term had ended.  Had Debtors 
received such notice, their prior conduct in diligently making 
all payments, including the interim increase, indicates they 
likely would have completed the plan base before sixty 
months if given the opportunity.   
 
Finally, conversion and hardship discharge would be 
nonsensical in this situation, and modification was no longer 
permitted.  Considering the consequences to Creditor of 
allowing a cure and the consequences to Debtors of 
disallowing it in these circumstances, the equities weigh in 
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favor of Debtors, and the Bankruptcy Court reasonably 
concluded that allowing a cure would further the goals of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the plan. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court was 
well within its discretion to decline to dismiss and to grant 
summary judgment and a discharge to Debtors. 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order and 
judgment of the District Court, and by extension the 
Bankruptcy Court.  
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